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Annuitization is often considered a socially desirable payout mode from pension plans, 
because it provides a lifelong income stream and therefore ensures that retirees will not 
run out of money. However, annuitization is rare in most countries. This project examines 
workers’ choices during the payout stage in Chile, the only country that has had 
mandatory personal accounts long enough to have had substantial experience with 
payouts. Upon retirement, workers in Chile have limited options for payouts: they must 
either annuitize or take gradual withdrawal. Two-thirds have annuitized. We expect that 
retirees are less likely to annuitize if their accumulation finances a pension in the vicinity 
of the minimum pension, whose value is guaranteed by the state. In that case, publicly-
financed longevity insurance is likely to crowd out private annuity insurance. We expect 
that retirees with health problems are also less likely to annuitize, possibly leading to 
adverse selection. Finally, we expect that individuals with greater risk aversion, smaller 
time preference and better knowledge about the system are more likely to annuitize. A 
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Crowd-out, Adverse Selection and Individual Preferences in Annuity Markets: 
Evidence from a new retrospective data set in Chile 
 
Alejandra C. Edwards and Estelle James 
 
Policy-makers often consider annuitization a socially desirable payout mode for 
defined contribution pension plans, because it provides a lifelong income stream and 
therefore ensures that retirees will not run out of money. Theoretical analyses also imply 
large utility gains for individuals. However, voluntary purchase of annuities by holders of 
401k plans or other forms of retirement saving is extremely low in the US and in most 
other countries. This seeming paradox has been explained by the dominance of public DB 
plans that are close substitutes for annuities, adverse selection in annuity markets, and 
incomplete insurance markets for other risks of old age (Brown, Mitchell and Poterba 
2001, James and Vittas 2001, James and Song 2001). This paper examines workers’ 
choices during the retirement stage in Chile, the only country that has had mandatory 
personal accounts long enough to have had substantial experience with payouts.  
The system adopted by Chile in 1981 requires workers to contribute to defined 
contribution accounts, which can only be accessed after reaching the normal pension age 
(or earlier if accumulations pass a minimum threshold), while the government provides a 
minimum pension guarantee (MPG) financed by general revenues.  Pensioners are 
required to purchase annuities or to take gradual withdrawals according to a formula set 
by the regulator (lump sum withdrawals are severely limited). Programmed withdrawals 
are front-loaded, hence better for short-lived individuals, and allow retirees to retain some 
investment control as well as bequest rights. Annuitization, however, provides longevity 
and investment insurance. In sharp contrast to the experience of other countries, two-
thirds of all current retirees in Chile have purchased annuities. Using a new retrospective 
data set, we analyze retirees’ choice of payout mode, focusing on three issues: Will 
public insurance (the MPG) drive out private insurance (annuities)? Will adverse 
selection based on health status or life expectancy interfere with the efficient operation of 
private annuity markets? And, what role do individual characteristics, such as risk 
aversion, time preference, bequest motive and information play? 
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Part I summarizes the incentives and constraints faced by retirees in Chile. Part II 
lays out our data and main hypotheses about who annuitizes and why. Part III presents 
the results of our probit analysis. In the full sample and in the subset of normal age 
pensioners, proximity to the MPG is the key factor determining whether or not the person 
annuitizes. Having a pension below or close to the MPG indicates that the person does 
not have choice of payout mode (i.e. is required to take gradual withdrawals) or is 
strongly protected by public insurance, making private annuity insurance unnecessary. In 
the subset of early retirees, who have larger pensions, choice and only weak protection by 
the MPG, annuitization rates are higher—over 80%. Moreover, individual characteristics 
such as health status, risk aversion and time preference play important roles--but this 
result is sensitive to the measure used, with measures based on behavior having more 
significant effects than attitudinal measures. We find evidence of modest adverse 
selection. Knowledge about how the system works strongly encourages annuitization. 
 
I. Incentives and Constraints on Payouts in Chile1 
 
Payout options 
Accumulations in the new Chilean pension system started in 1981 and old age 
payouts were permitted from 1983 on. The payout rules were fairly stable until August 
2004, when they underwent a substantial change. In this paper we concentrate on the 
rules and their impact as of 2002, the year our data were collected.   
Payouts are tightly circumscribed. Lump sum withdrawals are not permitted 
except under narrowly specified circumstances—the remaining accumulation must be 
large enough to produce a pension that is at least 70% of the worker’s average wage over 
the past ten years and 120% of the MPG (gradually raised to 150%, starting in 2004). 
Few workers have met this requirement. Basically, workers must choose between 
annuities versus programmed withdrawals (PW).2 Additionally, workers must choose 
their age of retirement, subject to eligibility conditions that are described below. In all 
cases, pensions must be price-indexed.3 Married men (and other men and women with 
dependents) must purchase joint pensions, with the surviving widow receiving at least 
60% of the husband’s pension.4  
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How annuities and programmed withdrawals work  
Under annuitization, the entire accumulation becomes a premium that retirees turn 
over to an insurance company in exchange for an annuity.  The insurance regulator sets 
detailed rules, including reserves that the company must hold to back the annuity. The 
individual foregoes future control over investments and gives up the right to leave 
bequests (except for that embodied in a joint or guaranteed period annuity, which are 
commonly used), but gets a stable income stream that is guaranteed for life.   
Subject to meeting regulatory requirements, insurance companies determine 
annuity payouts and bear the longevity and interest rate risk. The monthly annuity payout 
for a worker who retires at age x = initial premium/ax, where ax is an actuarial factor that 
depends on the assumed mortality tables and interest rate. The actuarial factor is set such 
that, for the given survival and discount rates, the expected present value of the stream of 
payouts equals the initial premium and accumulation. While reserve requirements are 
calculated according to the regulator’s interest and mortality rate assumptions, insurance 
companies can choose their own assumptions when determining the actuarial factor and 
resulting payouts. They also bear the risk that stems from this choice.  
Under programmed withdrawals the worker’s retirement savings stay in his 
account in the AFP system but face somewhat more conservative investment restrictions 
than they did during the accumulation stage. The retiree retains control over choice of 
AFP and, since 2002, of portfolio, as well as bequest rights over the accumulation, 
subject to rules established by the AFP regulator. As in the case of annuities, the initial 
PW payout = total accumulation/ax. However, for PW the regulator determines ax--
usually making higher interest and mortality rate assumptions that produce a smaller ax 
and larger initial payout than would obtain for annuities. But this payout is fixed for only 
one year, after which another calculation is made for the following year, and so on. In 
year 2 the new pension equals the new accumulation (= initial funds minus actual 
withdrawals plus actual investment earnings), divided by ax+1.  
In general, the PW formula leads to a pension that is higher than annuities at first, 
but declines dramatically over the individual’s retirement years as the accumulation is 
drawn down. The individual, rather than the AFP, bears the risk that his pension will 
decline due to lower than expected investment returns or greater than expected longevity.  
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The minimum pension guarantee (MPG) 
Regardless of the options chosen, government promises to keep the pension at or 
above the minimum pension guarantee (MPG), providing the worker has contributed at 
least 20 years. Currently the MPG is about 25% of the average wage for a normal age 
retiree. It jumps by about 9% once pensioners reach the age of 70. Since 2004 it jumps 
another 5% when they reach age 75. Older pensioners will therefore get 29% of the 
average wage. It is reduced for early retirees and is partially means-tested.5 
If, upon retirement, the worker’s own accumulation is not large enough to cover a 
lifetime pension at or above the MPG floor (<MPG*ax, because of low wage rates or 
years of contributions), she must take PW and draw down her account at the MPG level. 
After the account is used up, the pension is financed by the public treasury, out of general 
revenues, providing she meets the 20-year eligibility requirement. If she does not reach 
the 20-year point, she draws down the balance at or below the MPG level and once the 
account is empty, the pension disappears. 
By law the MPG is indexed to the consumers’ price index, but in reality it has 
been rising with wages, due to political decisions. Over the period 1981-2002, real wages 
rose by 50% while the MPG for retirees under age 70 rose by 41% and for those over age 
70 it rose by 54%.  When the MPG rises, this increase applies to the old stock of retirees 
as well as the new flow. This means that annuitants who started above the MPG may 
nevertheless get a subsidy eventually, if the MPG rises above their annuity level as they 
age. For PW pensioners who started out above the MPG level, if their falling payout hits 
the rising MPG, payouts must stay at the new MPG level until the account is used up, at 
which point the government steps in and pays the entire pension. Since the real pension 
floor has been rising over time, low pensions are also likely to rise as the retiree ages. 
Thus, the MPG reduces the retiree’s longevity and investment risk under PW, the 
risk of running out of money due to early access and the risk of falling behind workers, 
on average, in standard of living. But the reduced risk to the pensioner is matched by an 
increased risk to the public treasury, which is left with a contingent liability. Three 
important implications of the MPG: 
 6
1) Many retirees do not have the 20 years of contribution needed for eligibility. 
To get insurance, they may purchase an annuity, providing their accumulation 
=>MPG*ax; otherwise they must take PW and forego insurance.6  
2) Among the eligible, those whose initial pensions are well above the MPG get 
only “weak protection”, in the sense that their payouts would have to fall or the MPG to 
rise substantially for them to get a subsidy. In contrast, those whose initial pensions are 
close to the MPG get “strong protection” in the sense that the state subsidy will maintain 
virtually that full level, or even higher. 
3) Thus, incentives stemming from the MPG differ widely across individuals 
depending on their years of contributions and initial pension size. 
Choice between normal and early pension age 
Besides this choice between PW and annuitization, workers must also choose the 
age at which they will begin to withdraw their money from the system. Normal pension 
age is 65 for men, 60 for women. After this age any worker may begin withdrawing 
funds, regardless of how much he or she has accumulated. But starting in 1988 
regulations began to facilitate earlier withdrawals. Early withdrawal was permitted once 
workers had an accumulation large enough to finance a pension that was 110% of the 
MPG and 50% of their own average wage (gradually raised to 150% and 70%, 
respectively, starting in 2004).  Workers have an incentive to start an early pension as 
soon as they meet this pre-condition, because after doing so they may continue working 
but do not have to pay any further pension payroll tax (see Edwards and James 2006).  As 
of 2002, 60% of all pensioners were early pensioners.  
Early pensioners get only “weak” protection from the MPG. Their initial payouts 
are considerably higher than the pension floor. Their actuarial factors are larger than 
would obtain if they had postponed pensioning and the applicable MPG is reduced for 
them in proportion to their higher actuarial factors.7 Moreover, the floor does not apply at 
all until they reach the normal pension age. To get strong longevity and investment 
insurance they must annuitize, and we expect many to do so. 
Since only workers with relatively large accumulations qualify for early 
pensioning, this leaves those with relatively small accumulations and pensions as normal 
age pensioners. Many of them are constrained to take PW, because they cannot cover the 
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price of an annuity at or above the MPG level. Others have the option to annuitize, but 
often with pension amounts that are fairly close to the MPG.  Because they get “strong” 
longevity and investment insurance from the MPG (if they meet the eligibility 
conditions), we expect them to choose PW disproportionately.  
Indeed, as of 2003, two-thirds of all normal old age pensioners were on PW and   
79% of these were receiving a pension at the MPG level, although they did not all start 
out there. The 79% comprised 67% who were still drawing down their own accounts and 
12% who were already getting the public subsidy. In contrast, only 15% of early  
pensioners were on PW, 18% of these were at the MPG level, but none were yet 
receiving a public subsidy.  While 85% of early pensioners were annuitants, only 35% of 
normal age pensioners were annuitants. Table 1A displays the distribution of payouts to 
early retirees versus normal retirees, in the form of annuities versus programmed 
withdrawals, for the stock of pensioners in 2002. Table 1B does the same for our sample, 
which slightly over-samples annuitants among normal age retirees. 
The choice and no-choice sub-groups 
One sub-group of retirees does not have a choice between annuities and PW at the 
time of pension: those whom, upon retirement, do not have an accumulation large enough 
to purchase an annuity at or above the MPG floor.  They must stay in PW. All members 
of this no-choice sub-group are normal age pensioners, but some normal age pensioners 
are members of the choice sub-group.  In contrast, anyone who meets the pre-conditions 
for early pensioning could purchase an annuity that exceeds the MPG; hence all early 
pensioners are members of the choice sub-group.   
An ideal set up to study payout choices would separate individuals with choice 
from those without and would focus the analysis on the sub-sample with choice.  This 
would be possible if we had data about individual accumulation and average earnings at 
the time of first pension.  In addition, the ideal setup would distinguish between choice-
makers who were and were not protected by the MPG.  This would be possible if we 
knew the number of contributory years at the time of first pension.  Unfortunately, none 
of these variables are explicitly captured by our sample.  Therefore, we are forced to look 
for an alternative way to proxy the choice group and the group that received strong 
protection from the MPG.    
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As described in Part II, we use early pensioners as our pure choice group.  This 
excludes some normal age pensioners who had choice, but it does not make the error of 
including individuals who had no choice. Therefore we run one set of regressions for 
early pensioners only, and two other sets for normal age pensioners and for the sample as 
a whole; the latter two sets include people with and without choice. Also as discussed 
above, early pensioners get only weak protection from the MPG while normal age 
pensioners include many individuals with strong protection. 
The model 
Consider Ai to be the annuity person i can obtain at the time the choice is being 
made, given accumulated contributions, age, sex and survivors. If Ai ≥  MPG, the person 
is in the choice group. For those who are in the choice group, the probability of 
annuitzing, pa, depends on its expected utility relative to the expected utility from PW, 
EUi(A) vs. EUi(PW). Expected utility depends on the time stream of income under these 
two options and the bequest left to heirs at the end. Payment per period is certain for 
annuities, uncertain for PW, depending on investment returns and time elapsed since the 
pension started. Payments continue until death under annuities and cease thereafter, 
except for joint and guaranteed period annuities, while payments may continue beyond 
death in the form of bequests under PW. Age of death is uncertain. Longevity and 
investment insurance are provided by the MPG 
Then, EUi(A) vs. EUi(PW) is a function of the person’s proximity to and 
eligibility for the MPG (Ai-MPG and years of  contributions, yi), life expectancy (lei), risk 
aversion (riskavi), subjective discount rate ( ρ i), bequest motive (Bi), and knowledge  
about the system (Kni). : 
1=ap   if )()( PWEUAEU >  s/t  )MPGA ≥  
0=ap   if )()( PWEUAEU <  s/t  )MPGA ≥  
0=ap  if MPGA <  
In reduced form:  
pa = pa1(lei, riskavi, ρ i, Bi, Kni, Ai-MPG)  if  yi  ≥ 20  and Ai ≥ MPG 
pa = pa2(lei, riskavi, ρ i, Bi, Kni, Ai)          if  yi  < 20  and Ai ≥ MPG 
0=ap              if  Ai < MPG 
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II. Data and Hypotheses 
 
Previous studies  
Previous studies on annuitization in Chile have focused on explaining the high 
aggregate rate of annuitization. James and Vittas (2001) found a high money’s worth 
ratio, close to and sometimes exceeding 100% for price-indexed annuities, which helps 
explain why annuities are a popular product. This result was confirmed by James, 
Martinez and Iglesias (2006) and Rocha and Thorburn (2006), who also emphasized the 
limited options allowable to retirees in the new system, the absence of other public or 
private defined benefit pension plans, and the aggressive marketing by insurance 
companies, as explanations for why the annuitization rate in Chile was higher than that in 
other countries.  
Using aggregate data obtained from the insurance regulator (SVS) and the 
pension fund regulator, James, Martinez and Iglesias (2006) hypothesized that 
annuitization in Chile was less likely among groups with small accumulations (because of 
their proximity to the MPG) and very large accumulations (because they were better able 
to self-insure and placed a greater value on bequest rights and investment control). They 
also predicted higher rates of annuitization among groups that were targets of insurance 
sales agents. The aggregate data were consistent with these hypotheses.   
However, the data set used in this earlier study did not contain information on size 
of accumulation or pension at the individual level, nor did it provide data on health status, 
risk aversion, discount rate, knowledge and other important individual characteristics. 
Therefore, the impact of multiple variables could not be separated out. The present data 
set will allow us to identify those with small pensions and to control for other 
characteristics at the individual level.  
The previous study also investigated whether adverse selection existed in the 
annuity market.  Since the aggregate data did not have information on health status of 
individuals or on mortality experience among PW pensioners, the study used 
actual/expected (A/E) death ratios among different groups of annuitants and found some 
modest indication of adverse selection in the first few years of exposure. As further 
evidence of selection, A/E ratios were higher among those who selected guaranteed 
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period rather than simple annuities. The data set in the present study includes information 
on past and present health status, family health histories and the individual’s expectations 
regarding longevity, both for annuitants and PW pensioners, allowing us to investigate 
adverse selection more fully.  
New data set—its advantages and shortcomings 
A rich new Chilean data set (2002 HLSS) has just become available that enables 
us to carry out this analysis.  The sample is representative of affiliates in the new and old 
systems, from 1981 to 2002. Through retrospective questions, the survey establishes if 
and when the individual was pensioned, what type of pension he receives, how large it is 
and why he chose that particular payout mode. It elicits information about the 
individual’s health status, attitudes toward risk, other wealth and investment preferences, 
knowledge about the system and channels of information. The first survey was 
administered in 2002 to a representative sample of 17,246 working affiliates and retirees.  
We are particularly interested in the 676 individual we can identify as new system 
pensioners.8 We use probit analysis to examine their choice of payout mode. 
The data, do, however, have several shortcomings. Most important, we cannot 
identify the entire subset that had choice, because many questions pertain to the 
individual’s status in 2002, rather than his or her status at the point of retirement when 
decisions about annuitization were made.  For example, we do not know the person’s 
total accumulation or pension amount at point of retirement. Instead, we know the 
person’s current pension, which we use as a proxy for starting pension. For annuities 
these numbers are identical, but for programmed withdrawals the amounts change and in 
general decline from year to year. This means that some PW pensioners who are 
currently withdrawing at or below the MPG level, who appear to have no choice, may 
have started out well above this level and had choice about PW vs. annuities. Some 
pensioners took PW because they chose to do so whereas others took it because they had 
to do so, and we are unable to separate out these two sub-groups. In contrast, all 
annuitants, by definition, had choice.  
Our general strategy for dealing with this problem is to look separately at early 
versus normal age pensioners. We are able to do this because we know the age of first 
pension. We know that all individuals who met the pre-conditions for early pensioning 
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had an accumulation >110% of MPG--large enough to give them the right to choose 
between annuities or PW. In contrast, the normal age pension group includes a mixture of 
those with and without choice.  We therefore expect a higher rate of annuitization among 
early pensioners, and we also expect variables such as health, risk aversion and subjective 
discount rate to have a greater impact among early pensioners because they could choose 
in accordance with their preferences.  
Also problematic is the lack of identifier for individuals who are eligible for the 
MPG, that is, had at least 20 years of contributions.  We test the crowd-out hypothesis by 
using a dummy variable to identify individuals receiving pensions in the vicinity of the 
minimum pension. We expect this strong protection from public insurance to have a 
negative impact on the probability of purchasing private annuity insurance.  However, we 
know that some pensioners in this neighborhood are not eligible for the MPG—in fact, 
they have small pensions precisely because they did not contribute for 20 years--but we 
don’t know which ones. This should lead us to understate the negative impact of MPG 
protection upon annuitization probabilities, among those who are eligible. 
A related problem stems from survivorship bias. The fact that PW pensions 
decline through time means that some individuals who took PW initially have now run 
out of funds.  Since the survey does not ask about initial pension, these individuals may 
not be included in our sample of pensioners, even though they were pensioners at one 
point.  Because this “survival” bias is not present among annuitants, our sample likely 
understates the over-all propensity to take PW. However, this survivorship bias has the 
fortuitous effect of counteracting the problem described in the previous paragraph. Since 
the disappearing pensioners are inevitably those who are not eligible for the MPG, the 
surviving individuals are disproportionately eligible for the MPG, justifying our use of 
small pension size to test the crowd-out hypothesis. 
The disparity between current conditions and condition at point of retirement 
creates problems with regard to several other independent variables. For example, the 
survey asks about individuals’ health status in 2002.  While recent past and current health 
levels are probably correlated, the correlation is far from perfect. For this reason, we 
would expect only a weak relationship between annuitization propensity at retirement and   
health status in 2002. The survey does include a question directed to early retirees only, 
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giving them an opportunity to identify “bad health as a reason for early pension”.  We 
expect to find a stronger relationship between the answer to this question about health 
and the rate of annuitization among early pensioners—because it informs us of bad health 
at the point when payout mode was selected.   
Similarly, complex characteristics like risk aversion, discount rate and knowledge 
about the system may be different in 2002 from their values at date of retirement. Yet 
these variables are measured at the time of the survey, which is several years after the 
decision point for many pensioners. Beyond that, the survey measures these variables in 
several different ways—asking about attitudes and also about behaviors that may stem 
from these attitudes--and the answers are not always consistent. We test both approaches 
and, as discussed below, generally find that behavior has greater explanatory power than 
expressed attitudes. It is possible that the “attitudes” questions were misunderstood and 
behavior is a better expression of how individuals really feel; or it may be that the 
behaviors capture long-run tendencies and are therefore more strongly correlated with 
attitudes that prevailed at point of retirement. 
A final data problem is that the sample includes only a small number of 
pensioners who died and omits many important questions about these individuals. 
Therefore, we are unable to include an analysis comparing mortality rates of annuitants 
and PW pensioners, a direct measure of adverse selection. 
Variables used in our analysis  
We include publicly observable variables and variables depicting private 
information in our analysis. Public variables include gender, marital status, education and 
pension size. Private variables include individual characteristics such as health and life 
expectancy; preferences about risk aversion, time horizon and bequests; and the 
individual’s knowledge about how the system works.  
Insurance companies can take the publicly observable variables into account in 
their annuity pricing decisions. Individuals respond according to their private information 
about characteristics and preferences. Since insurance companies gather statistics, their 
payout rates are likely to adjust for any correlations between the publicly observable 
variables and expected longevity. That is, the true money’s worth ratio (total 
premium/PDV of expected lifetime payouts) is likely to be similar for most sub-groups 
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defined according to public variables, so average members of these groups do not face 
“price” distinctions in the form of differential rates of return.9 Therefore, the public 
variables will have significant coefficients on payout mode only if they signal 
membership in the choice vs. no-choice groups or the strong vs. weak MPG protection 
groups, or are correlated with private information about preferences. Pension size is 
likely to be the most important publicly observable variable, as it clearly indicates 
probability that the individual had choice and whether strong protection was provided by 
the MPG. Other public variables should diminish in significance as private information is 
added to the equation.  
We considered using early pension status as an independent variable for the full 
sample and, not surprisingly, when we tried this it swamped all other effects. However, 
this does not provide an explanation for annuity choice. Instead, early retirement status is 
likely a proxy for the underlying variables, such as pension size, that determine both the 
ability to retire early and the propensity to annuitize. Putting early pension status into the 
equation hides these underlying causes. Therefore, we exclude early pension status from 
our full sample specifications, but we analyze early pensioners separately.  
Table 2 presents data on means and standard deviations of these variables for the 
sample as a whole and for the early pension (EP) vs. normal pension age (NP) sub-
groups. We see that the composition of these sub-groups is quite different. The 
proportion of women is much higher among NP (women are 40% of the total for NP vs. 
15% for EP) and, as a corollary, married men are much more prevalent among EP (71% 
for EP vs. 46% for NP). Not surprisingly, over half of all NP but only a quarter of EP had 
pensions at or below the MPG level, while the proportion of top-level pensioners (> 
5MPG) was 4% for EP, higher than the 3% for NP.10 Current bad health was claimed by 
14% of NP, only 6% of EP. But additionally, 11% of EP said they started their pension 
early because of bad health. EP members are less likely to invest in risky assets, more 
likely to engage in long term planning and had better knowledge of the pension system. 
These differences in characteristics probably help account for the fact that, on average, 
annuitization probabilities are higher for early than for normal age retirees; but 
substantial variation remains within each group.  
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Impact of accumulation and pension size on choice 
Size of accumulation and initial pension are probably the most important factors 
that determine payout mode, because they tell us whether the person was in the choice 
group and was strongly protected by the MPG (if eligible). 
To begin with, consider a pensioner with a small accumulation that could buy him 
an annuity below the MPG level, say, 90% of the MPG.  This individual cannot take an 
early pension not can he take an annuity.  At the normal retirement age, if this individual 
is eligible for the MPG, he or she will have to start a PW pension at the MPG level.  
When the individual runs out of money, the state will pay the pension. If this individual is 
not eligible for the MPG, he or she will start a PW at or below the MPG level, and will 
likely run out of funds eventually, at which point the pension will cease. These 
individuals will be clustered at or below the MPG, as a result of regulation rather than 
choice.  
If this individual had a slightly larger accumulation that could finance an annuity 
just above the MPG level, say, 100-120% of the MPG, she would have a choice between 
PW and annuity. By choosing PW she gets a larger initial payout, while maximizing the 
potential bequest to her heirs. She also gets the opportunity to choose her investment 
strategy and possibly obtain higher returns than an annuity would provide. In the absence 
of the MPG she would risk a dramatically falling pension if her PW account is depleted 
due to long life or falling returns—and this risk might lead her to annuitize. But the MPG 
floor avoids this declining pension—providing she has the 20 years required for 
eligibility. The MPG gives her “strong protection”--almost completely protecting her 
from the downside of investment and longevity risk in PW, while allowing her to receive 
any upside gain. She is unambiguously better off choosing PW, regardless of her 
expected longevity or risk aversion. Thus, the availability of strong public insurance is 
expected to crowd out private insurance provided by annuity companies. This protection 
is particularly great if the MPG is wage-linked, therefore rising over time, as it has been, 
de facto.  Readers should recall that such workers are unlikely to take an early pension, 
both because they don’t meet the pre-conditions and because they wish to retain access to 
the full MPG.   
 15
Next, consider a pensioner whose initial accumulation could purchase a 
moderately large annuity that is 200-300% of the MPG. He, too, would get a larger initial 
payout and retain investment and bequest rights if he chose PW.  However, if he lives 
long or if investment returns plummet, his PW pension eventually falls all the way to the 
MGP level, which is far less than he would have gotten as an annuitant. Thus, this worker 
pays a risk-price for his higher expected income and bequest rights in the early years. 
Moreover, he is likely to be the target of intense marketing efforts by insurance 
companies, which earn higher profits by selling policies to individuals with large 
premiums. Sales agents will inform him at the point when he qualifies to retire early, will 
offer to handle the paperwork for him, and in the process will sell him an annuity. (In 
contrast, regulations constrain the ability of AFPs to market PW pensions). Therefore, we 
expect that retirees with large accumulations are more likely to retire early and to 
annuitize than those with small accumulations, unless they are in ill health or prefer risk.   
Finally, consider a top-earning pensioner whose initial accumulation is very 
large—enough to purchase an annuity that is 400% or more of the MPG. He may have a 
stronger bequest motive (if bequests are a superior good) and confidence in his own 
ability to manage investments. Like his middle-income counterpart, he faces weak 
protection from the MPG, hence high longevity and investment risk, but he may have 
greater capacity to self-insure.  These forces may push him to retire early but to choose 
PW. 11   
In sum, we expect to find a positive or inverted U-shaped relationship between 
pension wealth and probability of annuitizing. Individuals with small accumulations will 
take PW if they are in the no-choice group or in the choice group but strongly protected 
by the MPG—regardless of their individual characteristics. Workers with moderately 
large accumulations (the biggest group) are likely to annuitize—but individual 
characteristics can moderate this choice. Workers with top accumulations may choose 
annuities or PW, depending on their preferences for insurance versus bequest rights and 
investment control.  
As a corollary, annuitants will be concentrated among early pensioners, because 
large accumulations lead to annuitization and also enable individuals to retire early. All 
early pensioners have relatively large accumulations, choice and weak protection from 
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the MPG. In contrast, normal age pensioners include many with no-choice, strong 
protection from the MPG, and therefore will have a smaller proportion of annuitants. 
To test these hypotheses, we use pension in 2002 as a rough approximation of 
pension size at point of retirement. We suspect that reported pensions have a margin of 
error around the true pension and they tend to understate initial pension in the case of 
PW. Because of the imprecision in our measurement, we do not treat pension size as a 
continuous variables. Rather, we include two dummy variables to designate individuals 
with pensions ≤ MPG and > 5MPG, respectively. The first dummy is expected to have z 
negative effect on the probability of annuitization among normal age pensioners and for 
the full sample, because it indicates no-choice or strong protection from the MPG. It will 
have a much smaller and insignificant effect among early pensioners, all of whom had 
choice and weaker protection from the MPG. The dummy for pensions >5 MPG might 
have a negative sign, depending on relative preferences for insurance versus bequests and 
investment control. The omitted group, with moderately large pension, is expected to 
annuitize heavily.  
Expected impact of other publicly observable variables  
 As discussed above, we expect the publicly observable variables to have an 
impact on annuitization choice only if they signal membership in the choice vs. no-choice 
groups or in groups that get strong vs. weak protection from the MPG, or if they are 
correlated with information about characteristics and preferences. We also expect them to 
become less significant as direct information about pension size, preferences and system 
knowledge are added to the equation.   
Gender and marital status:  Married men must purchase joint pensions in Chile, 
which means that they get a lower payout from their accumulation than single men. This 
makes it less likely that they will fall into the choice group and more likely that they will 
get strong protection from the MPG—both of which should lead them to take PW, 
compared with single men.  On the other hand, if they have choice and want to protect 
their wives from longevity risk, they are more likely to annuitize.12 The net impact of 
marital status among men is therefore uncertain a priori and probably small.  
If unisex tables were required, this would give a higher rate of return to women, 
increasing their propensity to annuitize compared with men. However, gender-specific 
 17
mortality tables are used in Chile so this effect is absent (see James, Edwards and Wong 
2003; James, Martinez and Iglesias 2006). Instead, women may have relatively low 
annuitization rates for two reasons: 1) they have smaller accumulations, hence less choice 
and stronger protection from the MPG than men (this effect should be absent in the earlyi 
pensioner group); and 2) married women are already protected by the joint pension 
purchased by their husbands (women do not have to purchase joint pensions in Chile). 
Married women should therefore have less residual risk aversion and should annuitize 
less than single women.  
Education:  Retirees with higher education are more likely to be in the choice 
group and to have weaker MPG protection because they have larger accumulations. They 
are also likely to have greater knowledge of the system, hence about the utility they will 
gain from longevity insurance.  Both these forces should lead to positive effects on 
annuity probabilities. Once we control for pension amount and knowledge, these effects 
should disappear. 
Agent: Insurance agents and independent financial advisers who receive 
commissions from insurance companies (but not from AFPs) play a large role in selling 
annuities. The survey asks how individuals chose their payout mode.   We expect that the 
answer, “contact with insurance sales agents” will have a positive impact on annuitization 
rates. Although agents are very active in the early pension market and probably raise the 
average annuitization rate there, their effect on differentiating across individuals should 
be stronger among normal age pensioners because, within this group, agents are likely to 
concentrate their efforts on the minority of individuals with large accumulations. Thus, 
among normal age pensioners “agent” signals individuals who are in the choice sub-
group and are not strongly protected by the MPG.  
Age at which pension started. We considered using “pension age” in our 
specifications. Clearly, this is an important variable that insurance companies use in 
determining annuity payouts. But age at which pension started is highly correlated with 
early pension status. Consequently it suffers from the same disadvantage as the early 
pension variable did in the full sample—it swamps the effect of the underlying variables, 
particularly size of accumulation and pension, which determine both retirement age and 
choice of payout mode. Further, among normal age retirees there is practically no 
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variance in pension age, except that due to gender (65 men, 60 women). However, within 
the early pension sub-group there is substantial variation in pension age, which may be 
related to the propensity to annuitize.13  We expect this effect to be small.  
Expected impact of private information and preferences 
Among those with choice and weak protection from the MPG, we expect that 
private information about health and preferences will play an important role in the 
decision about payout mode. Annuitization is more likely for individuals who have a 
relatively high life expectancy and risk aversion, who fear they might end up with little or 
no pension under PW. It is also more likely for those with a low subjective discount rate 
and bequest motive, who place a relatively high value on their own future income. People 
with greater knowledge about the system will be more likely to act consistently with the 
utility gains that annuitization brings. However, these characteristics are irrelevant for 
those with no choice and those who receive strong protection from the MPG. Therefore, 
private information and preferences are expected to be more significant for early retirees 
than for normal age retirees. We use several measures to capture each effect.  
Health and other expected longevity variables. It is often claimed that asymmetric 
information about health and expected longevity could lead to a breakdown of the 
annuity market through the well-known process of adverse selection. If insurance 
companies expect that annuities will be purchased disproportionately by people with 
above-average health they will set their actuarial factors and payouts accordingly. This 
will imply bad terms for people with average or poor health, who consequently will not 
purchase annuities. This is sometimes used as a rationale for a public DB plan or for 
compulsory annuitization under a private DC plan. We investigate whether adverse 
selection exists in Chile. 
We use several indicators of health and life expectancy, including the answers to 
the questions: Would you say that in general your health is… (we coded bad or very bad 
as 1); did you have a health emergency within the past 3 years? (we coded hospitalization 
or surgery as 1); and, for early retirees, why did you retire early (bad health is coded as 
1)?14 The first question applies to 2002 and the second 2000-2002, which may not be 
highly correlated with health status at the point when the person made the payout mode 
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decision, so we do not expect a large impact. The question regarding reason for early 
retirement is more pertinent, so should have a stronger effect.  
Additionally, we used the question: Until what age do you expect to live (question 
1, module III, top and bottom tails for each cohort coded as optimistic and pessimistic, 
respectively)? Although life expectancy is measured in 2002, it is likely that the 
optimistic and pessimistic tails also applied at the point when pension mode was chosen. 
We also experimented with some of the potential arguments in the determination of 
survival rates, such as parental longevity and whether or not the person is a smoker.  
However, a key question is whether pensioners understand the determinants of 
life expectancy and its relevance to choice of payout mode. Regressing life expectancy on 
age in 2002 and a number of other variables such as gender, current health, parental 
longevity and smoker, we found that all of these were significant at the 1% level for the 
sample of affiliates. But among pensioners, who were much older than working affiliates, 
only current age was significant (health and smoker were marginally significant at the 
10% level). Moreover, for both samples, women had lower life expectancies than men, 
after controlling for these other variables, although we know that objectively, the 
opposite is likely. This leads us to expect that the underlying determinants of life 
expectancy are not well understood and may not influence the annuitization choice.  
Risk aversion.  The survey asks several questions related to attitudes and 
behaviors regarding risk, based on hypothetical and actual situations. For example, 
individuals are asked to choose between hypothetical jobs that involve lower mean wages 
that are very secure versus higher wages with greater risk (question 30, module VI).  We 
coded as “risk-averse” any willingness to give up some security for higher expected   
income—which only a small minority was willing to do. In addition, individuals were 
asked how they invest their own savings and how they would have invested their 
retirement savings if contributions to the AFP system were not mandatory (questions 8 
and 9, module III).    We coded individuals as “risk-preferring” if they invested their 
saving or would have invested their retirement saving in their own business or in stocks, 
rather than options like life insurance or bank deposits.    We expect that individuals with 
a preference for risky jobs or investments would be less likely to annuitize. 
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Time horizon, subjective discount rate and bequest motive. We expect that people 
with a longer time horizon and lower discount rate are more likely to annuitize, since they 
place relatively less value on the higher pension they will get in the first few years from 
PW and greater value on the continuation of the pension in later years. Again, the survey 
asks several questions that pertain to time horizon. Respondents are asked directly: when 
you plan your family saving and spending, what period of time do you consider (question 
22, module VI)? We coded as “long term” if they chose more than 1 year (only 14% did 
so).  We also have information on the individual’s wealth, as proxied by receiving 
interest or dividend income, owning stocks, insurance or deposits (question 26, module II 
and question 8, module III), having voluntary saving (question 7, module III) or owning 
one’s own home (question 30, module II). Wealthier people have signaled their longer 
time horizon, which led them to acquire wealth; hence are more likely to annuitize.  Also, 
their voluntary wealth gives them a source of bequests, so they may have a smaller 
preference for leaving bequests from their mandatory pension saving. We therefore 
expect that wealthier people are more likely to annuitize. We experimented with several 
alternative wealth indicators, including an aggregation of several forms of wealth and 
simply home ownership. We expect that wealth, which is an actual consequence of long 
term planning, will be a more significant variable than stated attitudes toward long term 
planning.   
Knowledge about the system. The new system gives individuals some choice 
about investment strategy and payout mode, so knowledge plays a more important role 
than it did in the old system, where a formula automatically determined the pension. We 
would expect that more knowledgeable individuals might be more likely to annuitize, 
because they recognize the value of longevity and investment insurance. Poorly informed 
individuals might make choices that do not maximize their utility.  
The survey asks a series of questions that allow us to measure the person’s 
knowledge (module III, submodule 3) 
Q35: Consider two individuals with the same history of contributions, one of whom 
retires at 60 and the other at 65. Who has the larger pension? 
Q 36: Do you know how the pension is calculated? 
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Q37: Do you understand the modalities of annuity? of programmed withdrawal? of  
deferred annuity with temporary payouts? 
Q45: After the death of a female contributor, is there a survivor’s pension left for the 
spouse?   
Q47: What is the legal retirement age for men and women? 
Q48: Do you know that, if you meet some conditions, you can take early retirement? 
      Q49: What is the level of the minimum pension guarantee? 
Q50: What are the requirements for obtaining the minimum pension guarantee?    
We assigned a 1 to the correct answers to these questions, a zero otherwise, and 
calculated means for the sample of affiliates and pensioners (reported in Table 3).  The 
majority of affiliates know the legal pension age and understand there is a possibility to 
get an early pension—two variables that obviously interest everyone.  However, when 
asked about more specific details of the system, such as various pension modes or the 
way pensions are calculated, most affiliates don’t know—although most pensioners do 
know. In some instances, the response is very sensitive to the way the question is framed. 
For example, in response to question 35, 75% of the respondents correctly answered that 
the person who retires at age 65 gets a larger pension than one who retires at 60. 
However, in question 36, where individual are asked if they know how pensions are 
calculated, the modal answer is “I don’t know”, when they could have picked the answer 
“according to the amount in the account and other factors such as age of retirement.” The 
correlation between the correct answers to questions 35 and 36 is only 5%.  
We constructed a “Knowledge Score” variable on the basis of the ten questions 
listed above, all redefined as 0,1 dummies, where 1 represents a correct answer.  “Score” 
is the sum of correct answers, so it varies between 0 and 10.  The mean value for Score 
for all affiliates is 3.1 while for pensioners in our sample it is 4.3.  We report the mean 
percentage correct for each question and the mean Score in Table 3.  
It takes experience and effort to acquire knowledge. Therefore, we would expect 
answers to these questions to become more accurate as a person ages, when the 
retirement system becomes more salient to them. In particular, individuals are more likely 
to become informed at the point when they have to use that information to make a 
specific decision—that is, at the point of retirement. So individuals who have recently 
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pensioned should be better informed than workers; and the means in Table 3 show this to 
be the case. In explaining the probability that an individual knows what an annuity is 
(20% over-all), this proportion increases with age—up to age 72.15 It is 40 percentage 
points more likely if the person is an old-age pensioner and 16 points more likely if the 
person is a disability pensioner (Tables 3 and 4A). We would expect that education adds 
to knowledge, and that people with more resources in the system will find it worthwhile 
to acquire knowledge. Consistent with this expectation, each year of schooling adds 3 
percentage points to the probability of knowing what an annuity is, and individuals who 
make voluntary contributions to their accounts or have a higher contribution density are 
more likely to know.  
The determinants of other dimensions of knowledge are very similar to the 
determinants of knowledge about annuities. Score is much higher for older individuals 
and pensioners.  (Most striking here is the fact that 89% of pensioners but only 4% of all 
affiliates know the MPG amount). It rises with years of schooling, voluntary 
contributions and density of contributions. But women, who have smaller accounts and 
less financial experience, also have less knowledge (Table 4B). We expect that a higher 
knowledge Score will increase the probability of annuitization and, further, that education 
and gender will become less significant when Score enters the equation because these 
publicly observable variables operate, in part, through their impact on knowledge. 
 
III.  Results and Discussion 
 
Our results are summarized in Table 5 for normal age pensioners (NP), Table 6 
for early pensioners (EP) and Table 7 for the full sample. Because of the strong 
possibility of multicollinearity, we start with specifications that include publicly 
observable variables without pension size and we then sequentially add pension size and 
private information about health, preferences and knowledge. The very high proportion 
of retirees who annuitize means that, essentially, we are looking for explanations for the 
minority who do not annuitize. As expected, we find very different patterns for normal 
age versus early pensioners, with the former giving the effects of the division into choice 
vs. no-choice, weak vs. strong MPG protection sub-groups and the latter giving the 
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effects of individual variation based on private information among those who have choice 
and weak MPG protection.  
Pension mode among normal age pensioners 
Looking first at normal age pensioners, half of our sample (but two-thirds of the 
population) in this sub-group take PW. The only highly significant variables (at the 1% 
level) is the dummy for pension size ≤ MPG, which consistently reduces the probability 
of annuitization by 16 percentage points. This dummy identifies individuals whose 
accumulation was not large enough to give them the right to purchase an annuity (the no-
choice group) and those who got strong protection from the MPG (if eligible). Recall that 
half of the normal age pensioners in our sample have pensions in this range and these are 
apparently the individuals who do not annuitize.  
Using agents to make the payout decision was also consistently significant or 
close to significance, increasing the probability of annuitization by 13-15 percentage 
points. We interpret this as evidence that agents only seek out those individuals who, they 
know, have choice and weak MPG protection. Indeed, the impact of agent becomes 
smaller and less significant when pension size is added to the equation The other publicly 
observable variables are not significant, although single men and married women have 
lower annuitization probabilities by amounts that are close to significance. None of the 
private information variables have a significant impact, in this sub-group where a large 
proportion have no choice or receive strong protection from the MPG. For them, PW 
dominates, regardless of their preferences.  
Choice of pension mode among early retirees 
 Moving on to early pensioners, the most important point here is that 82% of our 
sample (85% of the entire population) in the sub-group annuitizes. Which characteristics 
account for the small number of individuals who do not annuitize? 
Pension size. We expect that small pension size will be irrelevant for this group, 
all of whose members have choice and weak protection from the MPG. Indeed, none of 
the publicly observable variables are significant, except for very large pension size, 
which has the expected negative size (in specifications when private information is 
added). We interpret this as capturing the ability to self-insure, holding everything else 
constant. 
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Health and life expectancy. Among early pensioners, the action is all in the 
variables denoting private information about health, preferences and knowledge. We 
expected this, based on the fact that all early pensionrs have choice and weak protection 
from the MPG. While bad health in 2002 has no significant impact, giving bad health as 
the reason for early pensioning is highly significant at the 1% level, decreasing 
annuitization probabilities by 18-20 percentage points. At the same time, being relatively 
optimistic or pessimistic about your life expectancy compared with other members of 
your cohort has no impact, nor do variables like parental longevity or being a smoker, 
which influence one’s mortality rate. This may be the case because pensioners have little 
understanding of what determines life expectancy or the relationship beween life 
expectancy and optimal payout mode. It may also be influenced by the common use of 
joint and guaranteed period annuities, which weaken the link between the longevity of the 
primary beneficiary and the present value of the total payout stream. Thus, we find some 
evidence of adverse selection, in cases where the health emergency is substantial enough 
to influence behavior (leading to early pensioning). But adverse selection is not large 
enough to deter annuitization rates of 82-85% among early pensioners.  
Risk aversion and time horizon. While hypothetical risk aversion with respect to 
job choice is not significant, demonstrated risk-preference with respect to investment 
behavior is, decreasing annuitization rates by 14-18 percentage points.  Claiming that you 
have a long time horizon is not significant, but owning a home—that is, behavior 
indicating a long time horizon and ability to leave a bequest--is significant and increases 
annuitization probabilities by 11-14 percentage points. Evidently, behaviors that imply 
preferences are stronger predictors than hypothetical stated preferences. The behaviors 
may be a better reflection of attitudes at the point when the decision about payout mode 
was made; or respondents may simply be confused by the attitudinal questions. 
Knowledge Score. Finally, increased knowledge about the pension system is 
highly significant at the 1% level, increasing annuitization rates by 4 percentage point for 
every incremental correct answer, even after controlling for the other variables that may 
determine knowledge. Moreover, Score increases the negative impact of very large 
pensions on annuitization rates. Perhaps very knowledgeable people tend to have very 
large accumulations, the former leading toward and the latter deterring annuitization. 
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When knowledge is missing from the equation, the impact of very large accumulations is 
weak since it captures both (counteracting) effects; but when knowledge is explicitly 
added to the equation, with a strong positive effect, the negative impact of very large 
pension grows stronger. As a result of these factors, the pseudo R2 jumps from 2% to 8% 
when these private information variables are added.   
In sum, among early pensioners the small number of people who don’t annuitize 
are those who pensioned early because of bad health, have a low Score, or have very 
large pensions that enable them to self-insure. 
The full sample 
The full sample, which consist 60% of early pensioners and 40% of normal age 
pensioners, combines results for these two sub-groups. The private information variables 
have much the same significant impact as they did for early pensioners (except that bad 
health as the reason for early retirement was omitted from the full sample because it 
doesn’t apply to normal age pensioners). Additionally, the publicly observable variables 
now play a role, as they did for normal age pensioners. However, most of the other public 
variables become insignificant once pension size is added to the equation; apparently they 
operate mainly through their correlation with pension size.   
Small pension size itself is highly significant at the 1% level, identifying 
individuals who did not have choice or had strong protection from the MPG, therefore 
were likely to become normal age pensioners and take PW.  The vast majority of other 
individuals, especially those with a high knowledge Score, are likely to annuitize. 
Reasons pensioners give for their choice 
 Besides giving individual-level data that enable researchers to analyze payout 
mode, the survey also asks pensioners the reasons for their choices (question 17, module 
III, submodule 1). This enables us to evaluate whether the actual choices are consistent 
with their stated reasons. Table 8A summarizes these results. They show much greater 
consistency between preferences and behavior among annuitants than among PW 
pensioners. 
Among annuitants, 78% gave reasons that were clearly consistent with the 
advantages of annuities—they wanted a pension that would last their entire life or they 
were afraid that they would run out of money and be without a pension if they made 
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some other choice. Only 8% gave reasons that indicated clear misinformation—they 
couldn’t afford other modes, didn’t know that other modes existed, or wanted to leave a 
bequest. Consistency for the remaining 13% was ambiguous.16 This is in accordance with 
our finding above, that knowledge leads to annuitization. The high degree of consistency 
between preferences and choice among annuitants may stem from their relatively high 
income and education levels plus the fact that they all had to actively make a choice—
about payout mode and probably about starting date of pension, as well. 
Among PW pensioners, the story is quite different, with less than half giving   
reasons that are consistent with the attributes of the PW mode. 22% indicated they didn’t 
have enough money for other modes and 20% said they didn’t know that other 
alternatives existed—which is incorrect generally but might have been true for these 
individuals if they had only a small accumulation. Among the others, who presumably 
had choice, only 6% gave reasons that were clearly consistent with PW—they got a 
larger income initially or wanted to leave an inheritance.  
More than half of PW pensioners gave reasons that seem to be inconsistent with 
the effects of PW. For example, 26% chose PW because they wanted a pension that 
would last their entire life or were afraid of running out of money and being left without a 
pension. Another 17% thought that PW would give them a larger pension (in addition to 
the 3% who said that they would get more income initially).  
To examine whether these individuals should have made different choices for 
consistency with their preferred outcomes, we broke these reasons down further, by size 
of pension (Table 8B) and by EP vs. NP (Table 8C).  This enables us to determine 
whether the seemingly inconsistent responses came from individuals who had no choice 
or had strong protection from the MPG. We see that the proportion of individuals who 
didn’t have enough money for other choices or didn’t know that other options existed was 
much higher among normal age PW pensioners with small pensions—consistent with the 
likelihood that they had no other choice or no other choice that made sense for them.  
However, a majority of those with choice and only weak MPG protection continued to 
believe that PW would give them a pension for life or would give them a larger pension. 
For these individuals, the short run higher return on PW might have been mistaken for a 
reliable long run return, thereby misleading retirees.  
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Finally, it is worth noting that only 3% of PW pensioners and 1% of annuitants 
gave the desire to leave a bequest as their reason. Although the larger proportion for PW 
is consistent with theory, the striking point here is the small percentage in both cases. 
While the choice between PW and annuities is often framed as a choice between bequests 
and longevity insurance, very few people in either payout indicate a concern about 
inheritance and many people in both categories indicate a concern about longevity 
insurance. PW pensioners who care about bequests are disproportionately individuals 
with larger pensions, as suggested above.  
In sum, the vast majority of pensioners in Chile have annuitized, presumably 
because this was the only way they could obtain investment nad longevity insurance. The 
minority who took PW did so mainly because they had to or because publicly financed 
MPG insurance crowded out private annuity insurance. Adverse selection seems to be 
present but to have only a small effect. More troubling is the possibility that 
misinformation and mistaking short-run for long-term advantages may also have deterred 
annuitization, among those with choice and weak protection from the MPG. Reducing the 
short run advantage of PW for those with large accumulations and the prohibition on 
annuitization for those with small accumulations may be the most effective ways to 




Three important issues in the pension field are: Will public insurance drive out 
private? Will adverse selection by expected longevity interfere with the efficient 
operation of private annuity insurance markets? And, do people have enough knowledge 
to make informed choices? We use a new retrospective data set from Chile to throw light 
on these issues. We identify the characteristics of individuals who did and did not 
annuitize, in a context where payout options are very limited so two-thirds of all 
pensioners have taken annuities. In this context, it may be more useful to ask—which 
characteristics define the minority who did not annuitize?  
We find that small pension size is the strongest (negative) predictor of 
annuitization—which we attribute to the fact that it identifies retirees who did not have 
 28
the right to choose an annuity and/or have strong protection from the minimum pension 
guarantee. Apparently strong public longevity and investment insurance (i.e., public 
insurance that insures practically the entire pension from the individual’s own account) 
drives out private annuity insurance. This “small pension effect” holds for normal age 
retirees (where small pensions are common) and for the full sample (where it signals 
normal age retirees). However, it does not hold for early pensioners, all of whom had 
accumulations large enough to choose annuities and who get only weak protection from 
the MPG. 85% of all early pensioners annuitize in Chile; the presence of limited choice 
and the absence of strong MPG insurance for them goes far toward explaining their high 
rate. (But ironically, the small subset with the largest pensions nevertheless choose 
programmed withdrawals, probably because they are best able to self-insure). 
Using early pensioners as our sample of individuals who had choice and weak 
protection from the MPG, the main sub-group that does not annuitize consists of workers 
who were forced to start their pension early because of bad health. Thus, some adverse 
selection by health status does exist, especially if health is bad enough at the payout 
decision point to lead to behavioral change. The other strong predictor among early 
pensioners is knowledge about the system. Knowledge appears to be poor, as indicated 
by an average Score of less than 30% among workers and less than 50% among 
pensioners on simple factual questions, as well as a lack of understanding among 
pensioners on determinants of life expectancy. But knowledge is higher among 
annuitants, based on their average Score, its significance in the regressions and the 
consistency between their preferences and their behavior. These results provide 
confirmation of strong crowd-out and modest adverse selection. They underscore the 
importance of worker education about how pensions work and constraining the choice set 
to protect the many retirees with little knowledge.  
This study faced the limitation that we could not definitively identify all retirees 
who had choice vs. no-choice, and those who met the 20-year contribution requirement 
for MPG eligibility; instead, we used proxies.  We also lack data on mortality experience 
of PW pensioners, to compare with annuitant mortality experience. We hope to add these 
variables in future work, by linking the sample to administrative data on contribution and 
payout histories. 
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Table 1A: Percentage distribution: Early versus normal retirement, annuities vs. 
PW, aggregate stock of pensioners in 2002 
 
 Normal retirement Early retirement Total  
PW 26%   9% 35% 
Annuitization  14% 51% 65% 
Total  40% 60% 100% 
Source: calculations by authors based on data from Superintendencia de Valores y 
Seguros (SVS) and Superintendencia de AFP (SAFP) 
 
 
Table 1B: Percentage distribution: Early versus normal retirement, annuities vs. 
PW, sample of new-system pensioners in 2002 
 
 Normal retirement Early retirement Total  
PW 19% 11% 30% 
Annuitization  20% 50% 70% 
Total  39% 61% 100% 
Source: calculations by authors based on EPS 2002 
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 Table 2:  Sample Means 
 
 Full Sample Normal Age Pensioners    Early Pensioners 
Variable     
% annuitant 0.70 0.52  0.82 
% women 0.25 0.40  0.15 
% with post secondary schooling  0.15 0.16  0.15 
% married men 0.61 0.46  0.71 
% used agents to make choices 0.27 0.21  0.31 
mean age in 2002 64 69  60 
mean pension age 59 64  55 
mean pension amount in 2002* $121,919 $102,860  $134,438 
% with pension at or below the MPG 0.35 0.51  0.24 
% with pension amount >5MPG 0.04 0.03  0.04 
% reporting bad health as motive for EP    0.11 
% reporting bad health in 2002 0.09 0.14  0.06 
% reporting health emergency last year 0.25 0.25  0.25 
% optimists with respect to survival 0.23 0.21  0.24 
% pessimists with respect to survival 0.12 0.14  0.11 
% invests in risky assets or would do so  0.07 0.09  0.06 
% making long term planning 0.14 0.11  0.16 
% reporting home ownership 0.89 0.85  0.90 
Mean score ** 4.27 3.64  4.68 
Mean year of pension 1997 1997  1997 
% with early pension 0.60 0  1.00 
     
#obs 676 268  408 
** reduced observations 658 261  397 
* In December 2002 the exchange rate was $702 Chilean pesos per US$, so these mean 









affiliates Std. Dev.  
Mean 
pensioners stdev 
      
       
BASIC AREAS        
Legal pension age (men and woman) 0.806 0.395  0.891 0.312 
Given fund, pension increases with pension age 0.747 0.435  0.728 0.445 
Possibility of early pension 0.742 0.437  0.859 0.348 
Knows correct answer to 3 questions above 0.486 0.5  0.559 0.497 
      
PENSION MODES       
Annuity 0.202 0.401  0.596 0.491 
Programmed Withdrawal 0.192 0.394  0.525 0.500 
Temp Withdrawal with deferred annuity 0.069 0.254  0.246 0.431 
      
SPECIFIC RULES       
Pension calculation 0.138 0.345  0.182 0.386 
Survivors’ benefit (spouse of women) 0.115 0.319  0.133 0.340 
MPG Amount 0.041 0.198  0.889 0.531 
Qualifying rule 0.012 0.109  0.017 0.128 
       
KNOWLEDGE SCORE  3.064 1.567  4.266 1.791 
       
Note:  Calculations over 13,271 affiliates, 658 pensioners 
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Table 4A: Determinants of the probability of knowing what an annuity is 
 
 dF/dx* Std Error Pvalue  var mean 
      
age  0.011 0.002 0  39.456 
age sqrd -0.0001 0.0000 0  1707.090 
years of schooling 0.029 0.001 0  10.622 
woman -0.039 0.007 0  0.435 
makes voluntary contributions 0.065 0.010 0  0.159 
old age pensioner 0.407 0.026 0  0.056 
disability pensioner 0.166 0.060 0  0.005 
contribution density 0.095 0.011 0  0.677 
      
obs. P 0.203     
pred. P 0.169 (at x-bar)    
# of observations 12,155     
Prob >chi2 0     
Pseudo R2 0.149     
 
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
 
Table 4B: Determinants of Knowledge Score Among Affiliates 
 Coef Std Error Pvalue  var mean  
     3.07  
       
constant -0.502 0.129 0  1.000  
age  0.066 0.006 0  39.456  
age sqrd -0.001 0.000 0  1707.090  
years of schooling 0.142 0.003 0  10.622  
woman -0.164 0.025 0  0.435  
makes voluntary contributions 0.320 0.034 0  0.159  
old age pensioner 1.159 0.068 0  0.056  
disability pensioner 0.498 0.167 0  0.005  
contribution density 0.442 0.039 0  0.677  
       
# of observations 13,155      
F (8, 13146) 416.21      
Prob >F 0      




 Table 5: Probit results-normal age pensioners 
 
Estimates of dF/dx (Probability of being an annuitant) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age of pension --           
Post secondary schooling -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Single man -.17***-0.17***-0.17***-0.17*** -0.17*** -0.18***
Single woman -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Married woman -- -0.13***-- -- -0.14** -- 
Used agents to make choices 0.15** 0.15** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.15** 0.14***
With pension at or below the MPG    -0.16* -0.17* -0.16* -0.16** 
With pension amount >5MPG    -- -- -- -- 
Reported bad health in 2002     -- -- -- 
Reported bad health as motive for EP        
Optimist with respect to survival     -- -- -- 
Pessimist with respect to survival     -- -- -- 
Invests in risky assets or would do so      -- -- 
Long term planner      0.15*** 0.16***
Home owner      -- -- 
Knowledge score          -- 
          
Obs P 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 
Pred P at X bar 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.52 
#of observations 268 268 268 268 268 261 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 
dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*     significant at 1% level,  
**   significant at 5% level 
*** marginally significant at 12% level,  






Table 6: Probit results--early pensioners (choice group, weak MPG protection) 
 
 
Estimates of dF/dx (Probability of being an annuitant) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age of pension -0.01***       
Post secondary schooling -- 0.09*** 0.09*** -- 0.09*** -- 
Single man -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Single woman -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Married woman -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Used agents to make choices -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Pension at or below the MPG  -- -- -- -- -- 
Pension amount >5MPG  -- -- -- -0.18*** -0.32*
Reported bad health in 2002   --    
Reported bad health as motive for EP    -0.18* -0.20* -0.19*
Optimist with respect to survival   -- -- -- -- 
Pessimist with respect to survival   -- -- -- -- 





Long term planner     -- -- 
Home owner     0.11*** 0.15**
Knowledge score      0.04* 
        
Obs P 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Pred P at X bar 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84 
# of observations 408 408 408 408 408 397 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.08 
*     significant at 1% level,  
**   significant at 5% level 
*** marginally significant at 12% level,  




 Table 7:Probit results-full sample 
 
Estimates of dF/dx (Probability of being an annuitant) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Age of pension -0.02*           
Post secondary schooling 0.09***0.10** -- -- -- -- 
Single man -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Single woman -0.14** -0.10***-- -- -- -- 
Married woman -0.20* -0.16* -0.14**-0.14** -0.15** -0.14**
Used agents to make choices -- 0.07*** -- -- -- -- 
With pension at or below the MPG    -0.15* -0.15* -0.15* -0.12* 
With pension amount >5MPG    -- -- -- -0.22**
Reported bad health in 2002     -- -- -- 
Reported bad health as motive for ER        
Optimist with respect to survival     -- -- -- 
Pessimist with respect to survival     -- -- -- 
Invests in risky assets or would do so      -0.14* -0.16**
Long term planner      0.09*** 0.11** 
Home owner      0.08*** 0.09***
Knowledge score          0.04* 
          
Obs P 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 
Pred P at X bar 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
#of observations 676 676 676 676 676 658 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 
dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
*     significant at 1% level,  
**   significant at 5% level 
*** marginally significant at 12% level,  
--     included variable not significant 
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Table 8A: Reasons for choice of annuities vs. programmed withdrawals  
(percentage of total in sub-group) 
Reason  PW pensioners Annuitants 
Want pension for entire life 21.3 74.7 
Afraid of running out of money   4.5   3.4 
Gives larger pension 17.3   8.0 
Gives larger initial income   3.5   3.2 
Received present from sales agent   1.0     .4 
Permits me to leave an inheritance   3.0   1.3 
Not enough money for other mode 21.8   2.7 
Didn’t know other options existed 19.8   4.2 
Other    7.9   2.1 
Total  100% 100% 
 
Table 8B: Reasons for choice of annuities vs. programmed withdrawals: large vs. small 
pensions  
(percentage of total in sub-group) 
Reason  PW pensioners Annuitants 
 small others small others 
Want pension for entire life 15.46 24.77 72.46 75.68 
Afraid of running out of money   5.15   2.75   3.62  3.34 
Gives larger pension 11.34 23.85   6.52  8.81 
Gives larger initial income   1.03   6.42   2.17 3.34 
Received present from sales agent   2.06   0.00   0.72 0.30 
Permits me to leave an inheritance   1.03     5.50*   0.00 2.13 
Not enough money for other mode 29.90 15.60   5.07 1.82 
Didn’t know other options existed 25.77 14.68   5.80 2.74 
Other    8.25   6.42   3.62 1.82 
Total      
Small = at or below MPG 
*this percentage rises to 8.3 if this group is restricted to those with pensions above 4MPG 
 
Table 8C: Reasons for choice of annuities vs. programmed withdrawals: NP vs. EP  
(percentage of total in sub-group) 
Reason  PW pensioners Annuitants 
 NR ER NR ER 
Want pension for entire life 16.54 26.58 73.03 75.3 
Afraid of running out of money   0.79   8.86   3.05 3.57 
Gives larger pension 11.81 27.85   6.87 8.63 
Gives larger initial income   1.57   7.59   1.53 3.57 
Received present from sales agent    0.79   1.27   0.00 0.60 
Permits me to leave an inheritance   3.15  3.80   0.76 1.79 
Not enough money for other mode 29.13 11.39   3.82 2.38 
Didn’t know other options existed 26.77   8.86   6.87 2.38 
Other    9.45  3.80   3.82 1.79 
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1 For a fuller description of the payout stage in the Chilean system see James, Martinez 
and Iglesias 2006; Rocha and Thorburn 2006. 
 
2 The start of the annuity payout can be postponed through a program called “temporal 
withdrawals” in which workers purchase a deferred annuity upon retirement and take a 
monthly withdrawal during the interim period of one or two years. However, 
participation in this program has been small and the data do not allow us to distinguish 
between annuitants who purchased immediate annuities versus deferred annuities through 
TW.  Therefore we treat the few interim temporal withdrawal pensioners as annuitants-- 
which they will be in another year or two . 
 
3 In Chile, both nominal and price-indexed units of account (pesos versus the Unidad de 
Fomento--UFs) are in common use, and long-term financial transactions are usually 
quoted in the latter—a consequence of Chile’s long experience with inflation. 
Regulations require annuities to pay fixed amounts, designated in UF’s (although this is 
about to change).  Monthly payouts from PW are also specified in UFs for a 12-month 
period. However, PW valuations are recalculated every 12 months and the formula yields 
a declining real value over the retiree’s lifetime if initial assumptions are met. 
 
4 This becomes 50% to widow +15% to each child if there are surviving dependent 
children.  This requirement provides insurance for widows, financed by their husbands, 
rather than the public treasury. The wife is allowed to keep this joint pension in addition 
to her own pension, if she has worked (see James, Edwards and Wong 2003).  
 
5  The means test is implemented by requiring the AFPs and insurance companies that are 
paying the pensions to secure documents from the tax authority and the old pension 
authority confirming the absence of other income, as part of the application process for 
the MPG. This administrative cost makes retirees with low pensions expensive to such 
companies While required to enforce, these companies have little incentive to do so 
carefully. We are unable to assess how effectively the means test is implemented. 
 
6 Many Chilean workers will not accumulate the 20 years of contributions needed to be 
eligible for the MPG, because of their low density of contributions (proportion of adult 
lifetime working and contributing). Measured as aggregate contributors/active affiliates, 
the density of contributions has been about 54% (SAFP 2003). The average person with 
an account, who contributes for 54% of his or her potential working life, exceeds the 20 
years required for eligibility. However, analysis of our retrospective data set suggests that 
contribution densities are much lower—only 36%--for the first quartile of men with 
primary school education or less. Contribution densities are even lower—25% and 33%, 
respectively--for the first quartile of women with primary or incomplete secondary 
schooling. Many of these men and women dropped out of the formal labor force for much 
of their adult lives or are self-employed and therefore not required to contribute. They are 
vulnerable both to having very low pensions and not qualifying for the minimum pension 
guarantee. (Edwards 2006; also see Arenas et al 2004; Berstein et al 2005). Workers who 
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are not eligible for the MPG might qualify for the lower means-tested benefit for non-
contributors (PASIS). The government has recently proposed changing eligibility 
conditions for the minimum pension in order to increase coverage. 
 
7  At the point of early retirement an actuarial factor is computed that depends on the 
retiree’s actual age and the interest and mortality rates used in determining pension 
payouts. At the same time, the actuarial factor is calculated as if the worker were at the 
normal retirement age, with the same interest rate and mortality tables. This actuarial 
factor, for example, is about 13% higher for a male at 60 than at 65, thereby producing 
smaller payouts for early retirees. The MPG that may be paid some day is reduced by the 
proportional excess of the early factor over the later factor (i.e. by 13% in this example). 
In effect, part of the pension floor is traded off to permit the option to retire early. This 
trade-off may deter early retirement for workers with small accumulations who expect to 
qualify for the MPG in the near future. 
 
8 There are over 1000 observations of new system pensioners.  However, the sample had 
to be reduced to 676 as a result of missing values of some variables. In 2004 and 2006 
this survey was augmented by a second and third round, turning it into a panel, and by the 
addition of data on non-affiliates as well. Linkages to administrative data of individuals 
will eventually allow us to check recollections against actual records. 
 
9 Money’s worth ratios and rates of return have been shown to be slightly lower for 
women and for younger individuals, probably because of the greater risk concerning 
future mortality rates of these groups. Smaller accumulations also imply slightly lower 
money’s worth ratios, probably due to fixed administrative costs per account. However, 
the differentials are small. Most money’s worth ratios are in the neighborhood of 100% 
(James, Martinez and Iglesias 2006, Rocha and Thorburn 2006).  
 
10  Some early pensioners now have pensions below the current MPG, although they 
initially had pensions above the old MPG level. Their pensions may not be raised to the 
new higher MPG level because they don’t have the 20 contributory years required for 
eligibility. Even if eligible, early pensioners are entitled to a lower MPG and that only 
after the normal pension age. 
 
11  Also, some pensioners with large accumulations may choose PW because this allows 
them to draw down at a lower rate than the annuity payout, if they so desire. Postponing 
distributions may enable them to reduce the marginal tax on pension withdrawals. For 
this group, current pension will greatly underestimate their initial accumulation. 
However, this is likely to be a very small group. 
 
12  If they choose annuities, their wives get a guaranteed fixed pension, while if they take 
PW their wives benefit from the bequest if the husband dies young but get little or no 
pension if he lives long. Since the wife is usually younger than the husband and has a 
longer expected lifetime, she bears much of the uncertainty regarding husband’s 
longevity in the case of PW. Then, we would expect married men to annuitize compared 
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with single men if they want to protect their wives from this risk, while they choose PW 
if they take a less risk-averse approach on behalf of their wives. 
 
13  We know from previous work (James, Martinez and Iglesias 2006) that insurance 
companies offer a slightly lower money’s worth ratio and rate of return to younger 
annuitants, presumably because of the greater risk to the company from providing 
longevity and investment insurance for a longer period. Of course, these same factors 
lead younger pensioners to benefit more from avoiding this risk, when they insure. 
Therefore, the impact of pension age on annuitization probabilities among early retirees 
will depend on whether younger individuals value this longer-period risk-avoidance more 
or less than the extra cost imposed by the company, in exchange for bearing this risk. 
 
14  See question 25, module VI; question 27, module VI; and question 12, module III, 
sub-module 1. 
 
15 Virtually all affiliates are pensioners after age 72. The positive effect of “pensioners 
status” may outweigh the negative effect of age at that point.  
 
16 Normally PW pensioners are larger than annuities at the beginning but smaller later on. 
Therefore, claiming that annuitization gave a higher pension could be “correct” for 
individuals who were focusing on the long run. In contrast, some people we have 
classified as annuitants got a larger initial payout by choosing temporal withdrawal. 
Additionally, some sales agents give unofficial (illegal) rebates to clients who buy 
annuities, which would increase the initial value of the annuity mode. Therefore, desiring 
a larger initial payout could also be consistent with annuitization in some cases. 
 
17  The short run advantage of PW could be narrowed by basing the PW formula on an 
escalating payout or by reducing the assumed mortality and interest rates. The crowd-out 
effect could be reduced by requiring that all pensioners with small accumulations must 
purchase immediate or deferred annuities, with the public treasury paying the required 
subsidy up-front. Payouts to these pensioners in excess of the MPG initially, at the 
expense of the treasury later on, would then be avoided. This approach is currently used 
in Colombia. 
